In the Matter of the Estate of William D. Baxter : Petitioner\u27s and Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
In the Matter of the Estate of William D. Baxter :
Petitioner's and Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Heber Grant Ivins; Elias Hansen; Attorneys for Protestants and Appellants;
Dean E. Conder; O. Devere Wooton; Attorneys for Proponents and Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Baxter v. State, No. 10216 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4699
IN T'HE SUPREME CO,UR T 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ES- } 




Petitioner's and Respondent's Brief 
Appeal From a Judgment Admitting Will to a Probate 
of the Fourth District Court of Utah County, Utah. 
HoNORABLE MAURICE HARDING, Judge 
0. DEVERE WOOTTON 
Suite 12, Geneva Building 
American Fork, Utah 
DEAN E. CONDER 
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney.$ for,Responde.'l{ts 
I 
HEBER GRANT IVINS 
75 North Center Street 
American Fork, Utah 
CLARENCE M. BECK and ELIAS.HANSEN c----.-~~ ~;:--,··--------
Felt Building C~u, '~ ·~; ~~• 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......................................................... 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT.............................................. 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL...................................................... 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS................................................................ 2 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................... 10 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ERROR IN AD· 
MITTING THE WILL TO PROBATE SINCE THE 
WILL WAS WITNESSED IN THE MANNER AS 
PROVIDED BY LAW ................................................................ 10 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN 
HOLDING THAT NO ISSUE WAS RAISED BY THE 
PLEADINGS AS TO UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE 
EXECUTION OF THE WILL.................................................. 17 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMIT-
TING THE TESTIMONY OF 0. DEVERE WOOT-
TON, THE ATTORNEY FOR MR. BAXTER AS 
TO CONVERSATIONS HE HAD WITH WILLIAM 
BAXTER AFTER THE ALLEGED WILL WAS EXE. 
CUTED ............................................................................................ 20 
CONCLUSION ....................................... ............................................... 25 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
Cases 
Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 Pac. 2d 1942.................... 22 
In re Chafey's Estate, 167 Wash. 185, 8 P. 2d 959...... .................... 12, 13 
In re Dunlap's Will, 87 Okl. 95, 209 Pac. 6.51. ................................. 16, 17 
Fuller v. Williams, 125 Kan. 154, 264 Pac. 77................................ 11 
In re Keen's Estate, 299 Pa. 430, 149 A. 737.................................... 12 
In re Moro's Estate, 183 Cal. 29, 190 Pac. 168....................... .... ..... 16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX- (Continued) 
Page 
Olsson v. Pierson, 237 Iowa 1342, 25 N.W. 2d 357........................ 24 
In re Swan's Estate, 4 Utah 2d 277, 293 Pac. 2d, 683.................... 21 
In re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452, p. 456................ 11 
Winters v. Winters, 102 Iowa 53, 71 N.W. 184................................ 24 
In re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 Pac. 731. ............................... 21, 22 
Statutes and Rules 
Section 75-3-7, UCA 1953.................................................................... 18 
Rules 8 B, 8 C and 9, URCP ................................................................ 18, 19 
Rule 81 B, URCP.................................................................................. 20 
Texts 
10 A.L.R. 429, Annotation. "Wills: Place of signature of 
attesting witnesses." ...................................................................... 16 
57 Am. Jur. "Wills," Sec. 145, p. 133.................................................. 14 
57 Am. Jur. "Wills," Sec. 348, p. 257 .................................................. 15,16 
Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Ed., Vol. 1, Sec. 182, p. 444........ 19 
Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d Ed., Vol. I, -Sec. 187, 8456 ........ · 19 
97 C.J.S. "Witnesses," Sec. 288 ......................................................... ~ 24 
Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Vol. 1, Sec. 290........................ 15 
Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Vol. 1, Sec. 351........................ 10 
Page on Wills,· Lifetime· Edition, Vol. 2, Sec. 631........................ 19 
8 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 2314.................................................... 23 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUP·REME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ES- I 




Petitioner's and Respondent's Brief 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the question of whether or not 
the Testator, William D. Baxter, had mental capacity 
to make a Will at the time of its execution. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Trial Court found that William D. Baxter was 
competent and admitted the Will to probate. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek a reversal of the Trial Court's 
Judgment and the Respondent herein seeks the affirma-
tion of the Trial Court's Judgment. 
1 
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STATEMENT OF F AOTS : 
In' general, the' Respondent agrees with the facb:ras 
outlined in th·~ Appellknt's Brief but since certain:· facts 
~hbtifd~: ·be· -~Htrified ritore' fully ·!rom ·thH Respondent's 
standpoint~ an·· additioli;1l stafement will 'be made by the 
:Re·s:poiident herein: · · ._.frmt. 
' : . . . ' . ·. . ; . . . . . ·. ~ _; : . . .. ; -; ' . ~ : - . '- . : . - . . ' . ·. .. ' ~ \ ") 
William D. Baxter and Flora Baxter, his wife, l~ad 
resided in American Fork, Utah, for a number or ye~i~:. 
During tJ!e time of their residency in American Fork, 
th~y·: Oiuid -~cculll~lated a: i~:~a~o~able· estate. Flo'i·a~ lBax-
ie~; th~' firstw'ife oi Willia"m :0: :Saxter, died on MW':3b, 
1957. (''-)\.:' . 
After the death of Flora Baxter, William ri.''~ax-
• ' • • ' I -' ~-- . ' • '• ' •, ' • ' .. , -, - . ! '; ·,1•-r ~ : ,· I • ' 
~e.r _cQ_rrespond~d wit~ ·Ruth B~r:n.., a widow who li~~d i~ 
- ·. . '. ~ - - ' - .· . . ·' : -_ ~ ;_: . . ' 
~ngland_,- anc;l .a~ter some correspondence, he pr(~p~s~(d 
to her and invited h.er to come over to the United States 
. . . . . . -~~ 
to marry him. She ·came to the United States and m~r-
- • ' ' ( •• ' j 
ried William D. Baxter on Apr1115, 1958. (Tr. 31} · . 
• , ·• ; ' L .• 1',:, \··,I 
' ' ~· 
William Dee Baxter and .Flora Baxter had two. SO!lS 
• ' .. . . J.i;.'J ... ' 
a~ the iss-o.H pf. their_ marriage, Gilbert John Baxt~r .~J;ld 
. . ,. . . '. . . .·· ·~. ,. 
William F. Ba;xter, who died in the spring of· 196-0~r Wil-
.' • • ; .J, •• ' .·,; .. 
liam. F .. _Baxte:r, the son, . le~t surviving. him thr€(-e .. c}Jjl-
dr~n.who .are th.e grandchildren and the Protestants.to 
I' ,'I ' : ·• ' ' 1 ).' ':., ' >· ' 
the admission of the Will in this particular cas~~ .. '.-~P~ 
surviving son, Gilbert J. Baxter, and the second wife, 
the->surviving widow, Ruth Baxter, are seeking to sus-
fai~ the admission 'of the 'ViiL · (R 13) __ 
2 
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"Bill" Baxter. was a man· in his eighties in 1960 
and. prior to 1959 had enjoyed reasonaply good health for 
a: ~an of his age· as te~tified. to .:bY. his. perso.;nai .~physi­
cian .. (Tr .. 8) In 1959, he. was hospitaliz.ed with wb~t. .his 
• ·- ' I .. ' -", 
d~ctor termed an. irregularit:y of .tJ;te, 4~a:rt,which subs~-
. ' ·. .' . : • . • . _J • :. ~ . ~~·· to. •' • '. •. ~ 
quently threw an ''embolus'' and whi~~t cause.d .. a. weftk-
ness of the right side of his body. The doctor testified, 
''This was . not the paTalysis, this was . a weakness.'' 
(T.r~·s) 
. •::'l 
.,~~{.DJiring his lifetim~, Wil~iam:·D. Baxter had· 3:ccumu~ 
··.,,5Ji·t.J. ·' ' . ·.: . .. ·- ' ' . . . . '· 
l&teq_some income-producing properties .and _he had con-
~~y~d -some of these. properties .to his granddaughters 
but reserved the right to have the income from the rental 
of t-pese properties, by a verbal agreement, during his 
life,time. (Tr. 40-41) Subseq~ently and after his illness, 
the;>granddaughters in~isted and took over the· income 
- >).,''. ("1' .::. " . ·• : - . 
from 1.ihese properties. (Tr. 85) Thereafter, William D. 
"" •. 
Baxter ·made a Will which is the subject matter of this 
.. - ;.i!(1~o " .. 
lawsuit, which Will is dated .the 26th day of April, 1960, 
in which he devised certain parcels of property to Wil-
liam F. Baxter {who was still alive at that time) and 
Gilbert Baxter and the remainder of his property to his 
wife,)Ruth Baxter. This Will was witnessed by Guy A. 
Ri~hards, his attending physician, Donald S. Ryder, his 
clergyman, and 0. DeVere Wootton, his attorney. (R. 9) 
Before the signatures of the attesting witnesses appears 
the ·following: , 
''This instrutnent was on the. day . and da.te 
hereof signed, published aJ1d declared by the said 
testator, William D. Baxter, to be his Last Will 
3 
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and Testament in the presence of us who at his 
request have subscribed. our names hereto as wit-
nesses in his presence and in the presence of ea.ch 
other. 
''At the time· of -the execution of this ins'tru-
ment the said testator was of sound and disposing 
mind and had a clear understanding of the nature 
of the instrument being signed, and was not act-
ing under any menace or undue influence.'' 
William D. Baxter, on the 29th day of June, 1963, 
died in American Fork, Utah, and the Petition for his 
Admission of the Will to Probate was filed with the 
Clerk of the Court on August 28, 1963. (R. 3) 
On October 2, 1963, Lois Thomas, one of the g~and­
daughters, filed a. Protest to the Petition to the Admis-
s~on of the Will to Probate. In the Protest filed by 
the granddaughter, she alleges that on or about the 
26th day of April, 1960, that William D. Baxter was 
incompetent to execute the Will and that ''at all times 
hereafter was not of sound mind but was of unsound 
mind, incompetent and incapable because of unsound-
ness of mind and incompetency; that said unsoundness 
of mind and incompetency are so by reason of an exces-
sive brain hemorrhage or stroke sustained by the said 
William D. Baxter on or about the 17th of June, 1959, 
from which he never recovered and the effect of which 
was to render him of unsound mind and lack of capacity 
to execute a Last Will and Testament from that date 
until his death.'' (R. 10) 
Gilbert Baxter and Ruth Baxter both answered the 
Protest of Lois Thomas and a Notice of Trial was 
4 
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filed on the 13th day of November, 1963, setting the 
matter down for a trial without jury for March 11, 
1964, at 10:00 o'clock a.m. On March 27, 1964, the 
matter was rescheduled for trial for April 30, 1964. 
(R. 24) On the 21st day of Ap·ril, 1964, new objections 
to the Admission of the Will were filed by the grand-
children. The new objections to the Admission of the 
Will to Probate outlined as the grounds for the objec-
tions: (1) That the Will was not witnessed at the end 
thereof ; ( 2) that the witnesses were limited to sign-
ing their names and could not use the additional lan-
guage showing the testamentary capacity; and (3) "That 
on the 26th day of April, 1960, the time of the execution 
of the alleged Will of William D. Baxter, he was not 
competent to make a Last Will and Testament because 
of the unsoundness of his mind and lack of capacity to 
understand the effect of his signing the alleged will.'' 
(R. 23) In the Objections to the Admission of the Will, 
it is further alleged in Paragraph 5 that William D. Bax-
ter had suffered a severe heart attack and a brain hem-
orrhage which ''rendered him of unsound mind and 
memory.'' In Paragraph 6, it is alleged that ''because 
of the unsoundness of his mind and lack of capacity to 
understand the effect of his signing the alleged Will'' that 
he was not competent to make the Last Will and Testa-
ment. Paragraph 7 alleges that Ruth Baxter was mar-
ried to William D. Baxter in April of 1958. Paragraph 
8 alleges that Mr. Baxter had a sum in excess of One 
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00) deposited in 
various bank accounts. Paragraph 9 alleges that Mrs. 
Baxter, shortly after their marriage, '' ... began an at-
5 
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tempt Jo, secure all· of the money in which Willia~:·:·;o. 
Baxter had any i~terest . . . that the said Ruth Baxter, 
by menaee and undue influence,. secured the tra.nsf~~'::to 
her of all of the money and certain other property in 
which .. ,the ,said William D. Baxter had any interest.''· Par-
agrap:U·-_10 · ~lleges'that _ bec;;tus.e- of the property be~~g 
wrongf1;1lly transferred to. Ruth Baxter the esta.t.e had 
t4e right _to recover the money, and then they pray .i4at 
th~ W,ill be ~ec~ared invalid. (R. 21-24) 
The· ease was then ·set f tir: tri~l on April 30, 196.4, be-
fore the Honorable Maurice~ Harding, a.t which trial w1t-
ne~ses and evid.~nce. were produced and the Court found 
the issues in favor of the Petitioner and admitted the 
Will to Probate. 
During the course of the trial, the Respondents.(Pe-
titioners in the Trial Court) called as one of their wit-
nesses Dr. Guy A. Richards, a physician and surgeo.~ and 
also Sup-erintendent of the Utah State Training School, 
who resided in American Fork. (Tr. 5) Dr. Richar4s ~es­
tified that he had had. special training in the field .of re-
tarded. childre:p: and .. mental disturbances and was well 
qualified in this area. ,(Tr. 6) That he was one 9f: the 
witnesses to the Will of William D. Baxter and it was his 
. .'. ,. . ' .· . . 
opinion that William D. Baxter was of sound and dis-
po~ing mind at th.e time he exeeuted the Will. {Tr. 7}: Dr~ 
R·iehards, said that he bad seen. William D. Baxter on an 
average of about once a month from 1955 until the time 
of his death. (Tr. 7) Dr. Richards referred to the heart 
disturbance that ¥r. Baxter l\ad had in 1959 and that he, 
Dr. Richards., had attended to ~fr .. Baxter .during, that 
6 
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tim~~- He was asked whether- or not this had- any ·effect 
on the mental capacity of Mr. Baxter, and the -Doctor tes-
tified, ''I think not.'' ( Tr. 9) 
'·''Mr. 0. DeVere Wootton was called as a witness. He 
was the ;attorney who prepared the Will and repre.sented 
M't. Baxter during his lifetime. He was well acquainted 
with Mr. Baxter during his lifetime. Don Ryder, the 
other witness to the Will, w·as Mr. Baxter's clergyman. 
:M;r. ,Wootton testified that the Will was executed in the 
,r 
regular fashion as required by statute, (Tr. 18) and that 
he ~lso observed the condition of Mr. Baxter at the time 
: f ! ~ • . . .- . . . 
of..the execution of the Will and said in his opinion, Mr. 
Baxter was alert and said that he was in excellent mental 
condition at the time of the execution of the Will. (Tr. 
19120) 
Edith Grace Hamaker, one of the Protestants to the 
Will, was called as a witness by the Appellants herein, 
and she testified regarding three particular incidences 
of her grandfather. One of which was that she calle<1 
him to tell him that he had the new granddaughter and 
that-her grandfather, on the telephone, didn't seem very 
excited about it and just more or less grunted. She testi-
fied that following his illness Mr. Baxter, " ... well, 
after his illness, he just didn't seem like the same man, 
and he said some things that didn't make sense." (Tr. 
36) · Nevertheless, following his illness-, she had dealt 
with the grandfather regarding the rents ·on some prop-
erties and proceeded to take over the rental linits that 
had been owned by the grandfather. {Tr. 41-42) 
7 
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On cross-examination, she was asked, "Well, don't 
you base a lot of your opinion upon the fact that you say 
he stooped when he walked, and he held his head in his 
hands, and that sort of thing~'' 
Answer: ''Yes.'' 
Question: ''And this is what causes you to really 
think he was not competent, isn't it~" 
Answer : ''Besides the things he said that didn't 
make sense. '' 
Question: ''Now these things that he said that 
didn't make: sense was with reference to when 
you told him about your grandchild on the 
same day that the Will was executed~'' 
Answer: ''Yes.'' 
Question: "And the only thing that happened 
there was that you only got a grunt from him 
over the phone, is that correct~'' 
Answer: "Yes. It was an awful weak voice, too." 
(Tr. 44) 
Mr. George Hackford was called as a witness for the 
Protestants in the Trial Court and was asked his opinion 
about Mr. Baxter and he said, "In my opinion 'Bill' 
wasn't as sharp as he was previously.'' (Referring to his 
condition following his illness in 1959.) (Tr. 54) And ex-
cept for the fact that he thought Mr. Baxter did not rec-
ognize him as to who he was on one occasion, he had noth-
ing further to indicate anything about Mr. Baxter's 
condition. 
The next witness called by the Protestants was ~ir. 
Wayne Hamaker who is the husband of Edith Grace 
Hamaker, one of the Protestants. He testified that on 
8 
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one occasion he did not think that Mr. Baxter recognized 
who he wa.s (R 63), that Mr. Baxter certainly wasn't him-
self after his illness ( Tr. 64), and that his main opinion 
about whether or not Mr. Baxter had all of his mental 
faculties was the fact that his mind would wander back 
to the Eureka area, which was the area of his childhood. 
(Tr. 71) 
On cross-examination, in response to the question of 
m~ntal competency, he said, ''I feel that any time a man's 
mind wanders to a point of going back to his childhood 
he, certainly isn't competent to make a declaration as 
important as a Will.'' 
''Question: ''And that was what you based your 
conclusion upon when you say he was incom-
petent7'' 
Answer: "That's right." (Tr. 72-73) 
Lois Marie Baxter Thomas, one of the granddaugh-
ters and Protestants to the Will, was also called as a 
witness by the Protestants, and the only thing she could 
say about her grandfather is that following his illness 
"he just didn't act like he used to before." (Tr. 77) 
Other witnesses were called by the Protestants who 
testified, in substance, to the same things. Mr. 0. DeVere 
Wootton was recalled as a rebuttal witness to testify 
about Mr. Baxter's condition and his ability to recall his 
property and to remember the persons who were the 
natural objects of his bounty. 
9 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE NO ERROR /IN 
·ADMITTING THE WILL TO PROBATE 
SINCE THE WILL WAS WITNESSED IN 
THE MANNER AS PROVIDED BY LAW. 
. ' 
The Protestants, Appellants herein, have objected 
to the Admission of the Will on the grounds that it wa.s 
no~ properly ~tness~d since the witnessing had the lan-
guage. preceding the signatures ·of the witnesses to the 
effect that at the time of the execution of the Will the 
Testator was of sound and disposing mind. Protestants 
argue, therefore, that this is taking from the Court the 
prerogative of its determination of whether or not the 
Testator had legal capacity to execute the Will and tha.t 
it is not at the end of the Will as required by law. Cer-
tainly, there is nothing wrong with the witnesses pro-
claiming the fact in the attestation to the Will that they 
are satisfied of the mental competency of the Testator. 
P(J)ge on. Wills, Lifetime Edition., Vol. 1, Sec. 351, in 
discussing the formalities of execution states as follows: 
~'According to the great weight of authority, 
the· subscribing witnesses are required to attest 
the capacity of the testator to make a will. This 
includes capacity as to age, sanity, and freedom 
from undue influence. ·This point is often mis-
understood by the witnesses who think that they 
are attesting only the legal formalities of the exe-
cution. Such witnesses may, however, assume the 
sanity of a testator if they know no facts which 
would tend to show that he was insane.'' 
10 
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This Court, in the case of In re Swan's Esta.te, 51 
Utah 410, 170 Pac. 452, at page 456, had the following to 
say regarding the duty of the ~ubscribing witnesses: 
''In considering the evidence and its· sufficiency 
it must not be overlooked that the· fun~tions and 
·duties of subscribing witnesses to a I will in this 
state, and perhaps in most of the states, are not 
alone to witness the signature of the testator and 
formal execution of the will, but they must, at the 
same time, pass upon the question of his sa;nity 
and testamentary capacity." (Emphasis added) 
This same rule of law was followed in the Kansas 
case of F~tller v. Williams, 125 Kan. 154, 264 Pac. 77, in 
·which case the Court stated as follows : 
''But witnessing a will is a matter of great im-
portance and solemnity. Riee v. Monroe, 108 Kan. 
526, 527, 196 P.- 756. One who attests and sub-
scribes a will as a witness should do so with the 
understanding that he is competent to testify on 
the probate of the will that the testator had mental 
capacity to make a will and was not under re-
straint or undue influence. Lawrie v. Lawrie, 39 
Kan. 480, 18 P. 499; Hospital Co. v. Hale, 69 
Kan. 616, 619, 77 P. 537; McConnell v. Keir, 76 
Kan. 527, 531, 92 P. 540. The attesting witnesses 
to a will must not only witness the signing or pub-
lishing of it by the testator, but it is also their dutv 
to satisfy themselve-s that the testa tor is of sound 
_ and disposing mind and memory and capable of 
executing a will. . Smith et al. v. Young et al., 134 
Miss. 738, 99 So. 370, 35 A. L. R., 69; In re Swan's 
Estates, 51 Utah 410, 170 P. 452. 'A witness to 
a will must * * * satisfy himself * * • of his (the 
testator's testamentary capacity.' 40 Cyc. 1110; 
Dunkeson v. Williams (Mo. Sup.) 242 S. W. 653; 
11 
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Shouler on Wills (6th Ed.) Sec. 229, 524; Page on 
Wills ( 2d Ed.) Sec. 332. And see cases collected 
in annotation 35 A. L. R. 79. This duty necessarily 
requires that the attesting witnesses to a will 
should know and understand that the instrument 
they are signing as witnesses is a will, and they 
should do so prepared to testify to the testamen-
tary capacity of the testator and that he is free 
from restraint and undue influence.'' 
''Even 'the attestation of a signature to a will, 
or other document, is a direct assertion by the 
witness that the maker is competent to understand 
and execute it.' Snyder's Estate, 279 Pa. 63, 123 
A. 663." (In re Keen's Estate, 299 Pa. 430, 149 
A. 737.) 
Although the Appellants argue in this case that the 
addition of the language where the witnesses state that 
the Testator was of sound and disposing mind invalidates 
the Will, a case in Washington (In re Chafey's Estate, 
167 Wash. 185, 8 P. 2d 959) is a case in which the witness 
to the will did nothing but sign their names and put their 
address after their name without any further or addi .. 
tional statement, and the Court of Washington held that 
this will was void and of no effect because ''It was the 
duty of the attesting witnesses, under the statute, to ob-
serve and see that the will was executed by the Testator, 
and that he had capacity to execute the will.'' And then 
the Court went on to say: 
"It will be noted. that, while the instrument 
offered for probate contains the signatures of the 
decedent and two other persons, there is no sem-
blance of an attestation clause as the statute re-
quires. Nowhere in the instrument is the word 
'attest' or the 'vord 'witness' or any word of any 
12 
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similar import. The writing does not contain any 
form of attestation clause which would constitute 
prima facie evidence that the instrument was 
signed by Fisher and Brooks as witnesses in the 
presence of the testator by his direction or re-
quest. If there were an attestation clause- in con-
formity to the statute, and the will bore the gen-
uine signature of the testator (the signature is 
conceded to be- that of Mr. Chafey), that would be 
prima facie evidence of the due execution of the 
will. The fact that the subscribing witnesses were 
dead, insane, or were beyond the jurisdiction of 
the court would not defeat the validity of the 
will, if in fact it was duly executed. In such case 
the court may admit proof of the handwriting of 
such witness, and admit the instrument to pro-
bate as though it had been proved by such sub-
scribing witness in his or her proper person.'' 
Obviously, therefore, the attesting witnesses to the 
Will have a greater function than simply putting their 
signatures upon the page. The Appellants, in their argu-
ment, would have you believe that all the witness had 
to do was simply sign his name upon the sheet and, as the 
Washington Court has indicated, this would invalidate 
the WilL The witness has a function of attesting to the 
Will which means more than simply placing his signature 
upon the sheet, and to include in the attestation clause 
the language that the witnesses were satisfied that the 
Testator was of sound and disposing mind only carried 
out the function which the witnesses are obligated to bear 
when they sign as attesting witness to a Will. 
A serious question is raised as to the admissibility 
of testimony of subscribing witnesses who attempt to 
13 
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testify that the Testator was incompetent. This matter is 
discussed in 57 Am. Jur. "Wills," Sec. 145, at page 133, 
as follows: 
''It is generally held that when an attesting 
witness attempts to impeach a will by testifying 
that the testator did not have testamentary ca-
pacity, his evidence will be received with suspicion 
and the utmost caution, especially where the at-
testation clause declares the competency of the 
testator. Such testimony is deemed to reflect on 
the credibility of the witness. The theory is that 
the fact that a person voluntarily identifies him-
. ~elf with the execution of a will and a witness is an 
indication that, in his opinion, the person execut-
ing the instrument is competent so to do. Accord-
·ing to some authority, no weight should be given 
to the testimony of an attesting witness that de-
nies the mental competency of the testator. But 
the suspicion which attaches to the testimony of 
a subscribing witness impeaching the will on the 
ground of mental incompetency of the testator is 
removed by evidence that the witness was called 
upon to act suddenly and did not have time to 
deliberate, or that he acted for the purpose of 
pacifying and indulging an incompetent testator. 
In any event, the weight to be given the opinion 
of a subscribing witness that the testator was un-
sound mentally depends upon the intelligence of 
the witness and the opportunity accorded him for 
observation.'' (Emphasis added) 
The Appellants make an argument in their Brief 
that the witnesses did not sign at the end of the Will as 
provided by law and that the Testator didn't sign a.t the 
end of the Will as provided by law since this additional 
information was put in the attestation clause. 
14 
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Page on Wills, Lifetime Edition, Vol. 1, Sec. 290, 
makes reference to the place of the signature in reference 
to the- attestation clause and says as follows: 
''Questions as to signing at the end are pre-
sented where testator signs above the testimonium 
clause, or below th-e attestation clause, or in blanks 
in one of these clauses~ In most jurisdictions the 
a.ttestation cla.use is not regarded as a part of the 
will, but rather as a certificate to the will; and, 
accordingly, the signature of the testator may 
either precede or follow such clause and yet be at 
the end of the will. In the ordinary form of a will, 
testator's signature precedes the attestation 
clause. A signature of this sort is a signature at 
the· end of the will.'' (Emphasis added) 
· ·::,.~he matter of the place of the signatures of the wit-
nes~es is discussed in 57 Am. Jur. "Wills," Sec. 348, p. 
257, as follows: 
''The better opinion is that the signature of 
the witnesses are properly placed, within the 
meaning of a statute which states that the wit-
nesses shall sign at the end, if they are practically 
and substantially at the end of the instrument. If 
the signatures of witnesses are placed in such a 
position with relation to the concluding words of 
the will as to warrant a reasonable inference that 
they were· placed where they appeared solely for 
the purpose of attesting the execution of the will, 
they comply with the statutory requirement that 
they shall be at the end of the will. Moreover, as 
hereinbefore appears in the discussion regarding 
the place for the testator's signature, some courts 
hold that the 'end of the will,' within the mean-
ing of a statute which prescribes signing at the 
end, is the logical, rather than the physical or spa-
tial, end of the wilL 
15 
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''Clearly, a.n attestation cla.use intervenring be-
tween the testator's signature and the signatures 
of the witnesses does not invalidate the latter. 
Moreover, there is a signing by the witnesses at 
the end of the will, although the attestation clau~e 
is carried entirely across the face of· the instru-
ment, and separates the testator's signature from 
the signatures of the witnesses. (Emphasis added) 
See also Annotation. "Wills: Place of signature of 
attesting witnesses,'' 10 A. L. R. 429. 
The very cases cited by the Appellants regarding 
where the signature of the witnesses attesting to the Will 
should be support the proposition that the Will in this 
particular case is properly executed. Admittedly the 
statute of the State of Utah requires that the witnesses 
must sign his name as a witness at the "end of the will." 
Appellants argue that because of the attestation clause 
being included in this Will that the Will has not been 
properly executed by the witnesses at the end of the Will. 
The case of In re Moro's Estate, 183 Cal. 29, 190 Pac. 
168, is a ease in which the attestation clause was on a 
separate sheet from the sheet on which the Testator had 
signed at the end of the sheet as his Will and then the 
attestation clause was on a separate sheet with the sig-
natures of the witnesses on a separate sheet, both of 
which sheets \vere stapled together. The California 
Court held that the Will \Yas properly executed at the 
end thereof by the Testator and that it was properly exe-
euted by the witnesses at the end of the attestation clause 
and the same "ra.s at the end of the Will. This case \ras 
cited and followed in an Oklahoma case, In re Dunlap's 
16 
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Will, 87 Okl. 95, 209 Pae. 651, in which the same question 
was raised a.s to whether or not there had been compliance 
with the statute where the witnesses had signed after the 
attestation clause and on a separate sheet of paper, and 
the Oklahoma Court stated as follows: 
''We conclude that the mere fact that the at-
testation clause and signature of the "\Vitnesses are 
on a sheet or page following that on which the 
testator affixed his signature is immaterial. This 
conclusion is supported by In re Moro 's Estate, 
183 Cal. 29, 190 Pac. 168, 10 A. L. R. 422, wherein 
the court, in construing section 1276, Civil Code 
of California, which is identical with section 8348, 
Rev. Laws 1910, held: 
" 'The fact that the attestation clause was on 
a separate sheet from the concluding provisions 
of the will and the signature of testator, though 
there was a sufficient blank space on that sheet, 
does not invalidate the will, where the sheets were 
fastened together in proper order so that the at-
testation clause was upon the sheet immediately 
following that containing the end of the will.' '' 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN HOLDING THAT NO ISSUE WAS 
RAISED BY THE PLEADINGS AS TO UN-
DUE INFLUENCE IN THE EXECUTION OF 
THE WILL. 
At the outset, it should be noted that Point II Taised 
by the Appellant only raises the issue of whether or 
not there was undue influence in securing the transfer to 
Mrs. Baxter of certain assets by Mr. Baxter during his 
lifetime. During the course of the trial, the Protestants 
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attempted to introduce some evidence to the effect that 
there may have been a question about whether or not 
Mrs. Baxter exercised undue influence upon Mr. Ba.xter 
in getting him to execute the Will. This evidence "ras re-
jected by the Court. 
., 
As set out in the Statement of Facts in this Brief, the 
objections to the introduction of the Will were all predi-
cated upon the grounds that 1\1r. Baxter did not have 
mental capacity in which to make the Will at the time of 
the execution of the Will. The procedure for contest~ng 
a Will is set out in the Utah Code in U. C. A. 75-3-7, and 
provides as follows : 
''If any one appears to contest the will, he 
must file written grounds of opposition to the pro-
bate thereof, and serve a copy on the petitioner 
and on the proposed executor, if he is not the 
petitioner, and shall mail notices of such contest 
to the heirs. Any one or more of such persons 
may demur thereto upon any of the grounds of 
demurrer provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. 
If the demurrer is sustained, the court must allow 
the contestant a reasonable time, not exceeding 
ten days, within which to amend his written oppo-
sition. If the demurrer is overruled, the petition-
er and others interested may, within such time 
as the court may allow, jointly or separately 
answer the contestant's grounds, traversing or 
otherwise obviating or avoiding the objections." 
(Emphasis added) 
At no place in the objections to the introduction of 
the Will do the Protestants claim that Ruth Baxter exer-
cised undue influence on William Baxter in the execution 
of the Will. Admittedly, the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
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cedure provide for Ii])er~Iity of pl~.ading; .however,, even 
in the; Utah Rules of Civil Procedure certain matters 
must.·be pleaded with par~icularity. (See Rule 8 B anp 
. .'· - . _, . ~.. ' 
G aAd also Rule 9) Ho,vever, this matter. is set forth 
specifically in the Probate Code as to tl:le proc~d~re in 
filing a contest of the introduction of a. Will. The matter 
of a contest on the prob~te of a Will is in the nature of a 
speci~l proceeding and the forms of pleading, to the ex-
t~!ftth~t tl1ey are specifically provided by statute, should 
be l6liowed. (See Baineroft's· Pr'obate Practicf3, 2d Ed., 
Vol~ -1, ·sec. 182, p. 444.) 
' · .... 
"-· 
• 
Undue influence must be pleaded specifically, and it 
18 ·not sUfficient to make a general allegation. Bancroft's 
' ' ' ~ ·,'. . -
Prob:a.te Practice, 2d Ed., -Vol. 1, Sec. 187, 8456, in ref-
er~nce to the matter of alleging undue influence, states 
as follows: 
''Where the ground of contest is undue in-
(··~,',._ · fluence it is not sufficient for the pleader merely 
to allege the legal conclusion of undue influence, 
, but facts must be pleaded from which the court 
may determine as a matter of law whether the 
facts so pleaded constitute the claimed undue in-
, fluence. ''· 
Page;on Wills_, Lifetime Edition, Vol. 2, Sec. 631, 
stated as follo,vs: · 
"Fraud, mistake, and unque influence cannot. 
· be alleged in general terms; but the facts which 
amount to such fraud, mistake, or undue influence 
·must be set forth sp·ecifically." 
19 
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The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 81 B, specifically 
provides: 
''These rules shall not apply to proceedings 
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, 
but shall app.Zy to all proceedings subsequent to 
the joinder of issue therein, including the enforce-
ment of any judgment or order entered.'' (Em-
phasis added) 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AD-
MITTING THE TESTIMONY OF 0. DEVERE 
WOOTTON, THE ATTORNEY FOR MR. BAX-
TER, AS TO CONVERSATIONS HE HAD 
WITH WILLIAM BAXTER AFTER THE AL-
LEGED WILL WAS EXECUTED. 
During the course of the trial, the proponents of 
the Will put on the witnesses to testify as to the prima 
facie case required to admit the Will to probate. Fol-
lowing this the Protestants then called their witnesses 
in attempting to show that the Testator lacked testamen-
tary capacity to execute the Will. They tried to show this 
by sa~ng that Mr. Baxter, in his illness in 1959, sustained 
a brain injury which prevented him from having testa-
mentary capacity thereafter. It therefore became quite 
material to the lawsuit as to the condition of Mr. Baxter 
following his illness in 1959 and particularly at the 
execution of the Will in 1960. Some of the witnesses tes-
tified that his condition following his illness in 1959 re-
mained the same up until the time of his death. ~Ir. 
Wootton, the attorney, was called to rebut the statements 
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made by these witnesses and to show that Mr. Baxter was 
aware of his property, knew who the beneficiaries of his 
estate were to be, and was clear of mind as to the disposi-
tion he was making of his property in connecti~n with this 
Will. (In reSwarn/sEsta.te,4 Utah2d277, 293Pac.2d683.) 
This conversation with Mr. Wootton took place on J nne 
1, 1960, a little more than one month after the execution 
of the Will and shortly after the death of his son in May 
of 1960. This conversation related to the way that Mr. 
Baxter was aware of the assets he had, the beneficiaries 
of his estate, and could recall to mind the property and 
the disposition he was making of his property. 
The only question raised by the Protestants (Appel-
lants) in their Brief is whether or not Mr. Wootton can 
testify regarding conversations following the execution 
of the Will. The question of whether or not an attor-
ney may testify regarding the execution of the Will has 
been laid to rest by many cases, and the Utah Court 
has definitely followed the procedure that there is no 
privilege in communications regarding the execution of 
the Will. (See In re Young's Estate, 33 Utah 382, 94 Pac. 
731) We submit, however, this privilege of communica-
tion is a privilege solely to the Testator and the Testa tor, 
having passed on, the privilege is no longer available and 
especially is this true in Will contest cases. The privile~e 
in Will contest cases did not apply at Common Law, and 
our statute is no broader than the Common Law; there-
fore, insofar as a Will contest case is concerned, the 
matter of privilege does not exist. This Court held in 
In re Young, supra, as follows: 
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''The privilege was' not extended to will con~ 
·tests at· common law,· and, as our statute is no 
. broader than the common law upon the su'Q.j.ect, 
we have no right, even if we were inclined to do 
so, to extend the priVilege to will contests.'' : · ' 
I ·.:This discussion with the Testator and his attor1ley 
took place, as indic.ated, ·approximately a month a.ftd· a 
half after the execution of the Will, and he came into the 
attorney's office- to discuss with him his Will that he had 
made .. ( Tr. 178-179) F.urther~ore, at this time he b~~ught 
with him Mrs. Baxter: wh~ was present during the conv~r~ 
satlon, ~ndwhethe{~he stayed ill the room all during tlu• 
• ·. . • . f·.) ·.. . 
conversation or not IS not recalled by the attorneY::. (Tr. 
178) We recognize the rule that the attorney in a Will con~ 
test case would not be at liberty to disclose confidenti;;tl in-
~oxomation. given -him by the client that is unrelated 
en.tirely to the Will, but we subrpit in this particular c.ase 
that the client came in to discuss ·his '\Vill further and to. 
discuss his property and consider what action should be 
taken regarding the Will, even though it was after the 
preparation-of the Will, and that this conversation is all 
tie.d, into the matter of the. Will and in a. Will contest 
should not be considered as privileged communications. 
Furthermore, since Mrs. Baxter was present during this. 
discussion or at least part of it, the matter is not p?vi-
leged. We refer to the case of Anderson v. Thomas~ 108 
Utah 252, 159 Pac. 2d 1942, \vhich follows the authority 
o:f the case cited.above, In re Youn.g's Estate, a.nd recog-
nizes .that in a Will contest case there is no privilege. 
I-Iowe,"'er, in that case, it was a~ matter of a contest wheth-' 
er ·or not undue influence had been exercised in the execu~ 
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tiO.:tl: of a. D.eecJ and th-e: C~urt ~deteriD.ined. that there vvas 
no privilege because the. related· communications were 
g~ven ·in the presence :of third parties and, further, they 
!·(Hated t~ the execution of.th~ Deeq·.:tb.which tli~ attor-
ney was:.a witnes~, and f~rthermore.th~t._the co~~unica-
t~QP.~· .. ~ere in the C01J!Se :·of e~ploJ1?ent "\vhi~~ th~. client 
di<l n,~t desire to have t~em particularly confidential com-
municatioris .. 
. . Furthermore, in this ease the ·~ttorney for the Pro-
~ ''!. •% ~ • 4 ! J - ! . ' . ' ~ ' ' ~· ' -. ' ~· . • • ' 'I . ' .. , ' ' ', ; 
testa.nts cross-examined the witness at length regarding 
',~· _.'_'I ~ ~ •. ~: , . ·, -· ·. . . t ' '.' , ' , ~ ~ '. •• \) • ; : • ,' 
these· transactions and statements about th·e Testator and 
;'' ' ;' .... ~. 1' ' ' -
liis. aff~irs with his granddaughters. He, theref~re, 
wa:ived any objection. (Tr. 188-192) 
' . ~ \ 
· · :.certainly the Protestants have no more right to 
claim ·the privilege than does the Petitioner-Respondent 
herein have the right to ·waive the-privilege. In the mat-
t~r ·herein, all of the parties are claiming under the same 
person, and that person is deceased. The matter of priYi-
lege should be only a conditional privilege as referred to 
by: Professor Wigmore in 8 Wigmore on. Eridence, Sec. 
2314, ·wher.ein he says it should be only a "temporary 
confidentiality'' not intended to require s·ecrecy after the 
death of the Testator. 
, - .· In this case, any, attempt by part of the heirs to ex~ 
elude testimony, bearing. on. the T·estator's c~~dition 
'vould .. only be for the purpose of ,benefiting their interest. 
and, .<:lenying the full truth to be heard by the Court.! 
Other .courts have recognized that when the dispute is 
b~tween the parties claiming under the Testator the 
' I ' 
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privilege should not apply since this prevents the Court 
from possibly getting the full truth. 
See Olsson v. Pierson,, 237 Iowa 1342, 25 N.W. 2d 357; 
Win,ters v. Winters, 102 Iowa 53, 71 N.W. 184; see also 
97 C. J. 8., "Witnesses," Sec. 288. 
The Iowa Court, in the case of Winters v. Winters, 
supra, stated the law as follows: 
''At common law confidential communications 
to a physician were not privileged, and they are 
only so made by statute. Those to an attorney, 
however, were privileged, and it was held that 
the attorney might not divulge without the con-
sent of the client while living, but that, after his 
death, in a contest between a stranger and an heir, 
devisee, or personal representative, the latter 
might waive the privilege and examine the attor-
ney concerning the confidential communications, 
though the stranger was not permitted to do so; 
and, in a controversy betw·een heirs at law, de-
visees, and personal rep·resentatives, the claim 
that the communication was privileged could not 
be urged, because, in such a case, the p·roceedings 
were not adverse to the estate, and the interest of 
the deceased as well as of the estate was that the 
truth be ascertained. Hageman, Privil. Com. Sec. 
84; Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare, 387 ; In re Lay-
man's Will, 40 Minn. 371, 42 N.W. 288, Scott v. 
Harris, 113 Ill. 451 ; Doherty v. 0 'Callaghan, 157 
Mass. 90, 31 N.E. 726; Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 
Wall. 175.'' (Emphasis added) 
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CONCL.USION 
We respectfully submit that in this case the evidence 
fully bears out the Trial Court's position, and since this 
is a case at law, this Court should affirm the decision of 
the Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
O.DEVEREWOOTTON 
Suite 12, Geneva Building 
American Fork, Utah 
DEAN E. CONDER 
NIELSEN, CONDER AND HANSEN 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Responden.ts 
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